Tag Archives: RSA2012

RSA 2012 Day 4: IPv6 Vulnerability Management and BYOD

Two good sessions today, one on the state of vulnerability management in IPv6 and the second on the security issues with BYOD.

The vulnerability management session was interesting in that while Microsoft, all Linux variants, Cisco, HP, Juniper, Check Point and other OS and network device vendors have been implementing IPv6 capabilities into their products, the vulnerability management vendors have been sleeping.  They are just coming to the realization that customers would like to be able to perform vulnerability tests for IPv6 enabled hosts on their networks.  I mentioned in my post yesterday that the primary issue with performing vulnerability scans on IPv6 is the scarcity of the addresses in an IPv6 address space.  It is simply not possible to scan all of the addresses in a single IPv6 subnet to find hosts and to then probe for vulnerabilities in a reasonable amount of time.  The vendors are working on models to do this; however, no final “best practice” solution is available yet.  Some suggestions which were presented are to scan active IPv4 addresses to find the hosts and then check if they are running IPv6, to perform SNMP walks on the routers or switches to determine which hosts are running IPv6, review the CMDB for known hosts or review log files on network and other devices.

In the BYOD session, the primary discussion revolved around identifying the threats to mobile devices in general, but only two possible models for supporting BYOD emerged.   The primary threats to mobile devices as seen by the panel are:

  • Bridging from a mobile device into the enterprise network
  • ActiveSync vulnerabilities
  • Rouge base stations which can eavesdrop on calls
  • Lack of granular controls for many of the mobile OS’
  • Poor password usage since users find it difficult to type in complex strong password

The two models which were discussed for supporting a BYOD model are to either require the user to accept corporate policy controls (e.g. encryption, virus scanner, etc.) on their personal device by installing an enterprise MDM solution or to implement local virtual containers on the devices.  The container solution would solve the problem that if a user leaves the company, only the corporate container can be wiped and the personal container can remain in place.

In both situations, a security policy should define what applications will be made available to users who bring their own devices. This policy should be based on the criticality and security requirements of the applications as well as the usability of the applications.  For example, does it make sense to allow access to spreadsheets from iPhones when they really cannot read or manipulate them in any practical manner?

RSA 2012 Day 3: Securing IPv6 and Moving to the Cloud

The first session today covered the basics of security in IPv6.  IPv6 contains some features which provide it with some additional security.  Some are not actually features designed into the protocol but just exist because of the nature of the IPv6 address space, for example brute force scanning of IP addresses will no longer be possible with IPv6 just because of the sheer size of the address space you will need to scan.  Of course on the down side, this feature makes vulnerability scanning also impossible if it is based on scanning IP addresses. The same is true when using ULA addresses for internal private addressing (like the 10.0.0.0 in IPv4).  Since the number of ULA networks is so great, each company can pick their own and there will be virtually no chance that there will be an overlap with other companies. Worms will no longer be able to spread just by counting up IP 10.0.0.0 addresses and infecting the next active device.  Finally designed in features, such as IPSec or secure neighbor discovery do secure the protocol, howver, since IPSec is no easier to manage in IPv6 than it is in IPv4, it does not provide any additional security over using IPSec in IPv4.

Administrators should also actively implement certain controls to secure IPv6.  Controlling the boundaries of where headers can be distributed, controlling rogue router advertisements through using IPS and filtering at the layer 2 switches, and blocking tunnels (6to4, 4to6, etc.) from any but approved tunnel endpoints will help to secure an IPv6 based network.

The final recommendation is to develop an IPv6 security policy which parallels an IPv4 policy.  Everyplace where you have a policy which references IPv4 should also have a statement about IPv6 plus there should be some IPv6 specific statements to cover the IPv6 specific features.

In the Cloud session, the CTO from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Labs discussed how they use public and private clouds within their organization.  They have developed a very interesting model of using both public and private clouds depending on what the use case is for the data and applications being implemented.  The model allows the users to define their requirements for their application in an on-line tool and they will be given options showing which cloud based services are allowed to be used based on security level, performance, availability, cost and other factors.

RSA 2012 Day 2: Firewalls and Cloud Computing

This is the second installment of my notes from the RSA 2012 Conference.

Today was dominated by keynote speakers in the morning and technical sessions in the afternoon.  I attended three sessions, two of which I summarize below.

In the first session, “Firewalls – Past Present and Future,” a panel of 3 specialists from Juniper, Paolo Alto Networks and NSS discussed the future of firewalls.  The general consensus was that, despite the rumor that the firewall is dead; the firewall is very much alive and moving into new spaces as new disruptive technologies (cloud, mobile smartphones) are being implemented.  The firewall is now evolving to address a number of use cases, from the classic use case of filtering incoming traffic from outside the perimeter (outside – in), to filtering outgoing traffic from the internal network for such things as social networking traffic (inside – out), to filtering and protecting distributed public and private cloud based services which are capable of moving without notice within and between clouds.  In this regard one of the primary challenges is the overall management of this distributed firewall landscape.  Not only do the policies have to follow the protected object (e.g. the server, data or application) wherever it goes, the policies have to be applied consistently across the enterprise based on an overall security architecture.  The tools being developed for managing such environments will move away from the classic single vendor GUI to an open independent management console based on APIs.

The second session, “Data Breaches in the Cloud,” was presented by two lawyers and focused on what enterprises should consider when planning a move the cloud.  The speakers discussed the points which should be included in a cloud contract and what areas of the service should be reviewed as part of a due diligence the customer should perform on the cloud service provider.

The contractual points which I thought were worth noting were:

  • Defining the level of access the customer would have for performing audits on the providers cloud infrastructure.  Issues such as what may the customer audit, what level of access do they have, when can they perform the audits are some examples of topics which should be defined.
  • Defining what a security breach is in advance and defining what the time frames for notification of a security breach.  In some countries the notification timeframe is becoming regulated and should therefore could vary from country to country

Areas which the speakers recommended that customers should review as part of a due diligence are:

  • DR plans and other operational issues
  • What certifications does the provider have (e.g. ISO 27001, etc.)
  • Which forensic providers are used and what access levels do they have to the data if another customer in a multi-tenant environment is breached
  • How are multi-tenant environments segmented